An Averon Systems service
Averon Private runs frontier models inside hardware-attested enclaves. Before it sends anything, your client checks which image is running and stops if that image is not the one we published. The guarantee is not a policy commitment. It is a property of a build you can reproduce and check yourself.
01 The problem
People working under privilege, clinical confidentiality, fiduciary duty, or source protection are asked to choose between capability and control. Many of them choose neither.
Capable, and readable by the operator. Prompts arrive as plaintext on someone else's servers, pass through abuse detection and logging, sit in retention windows measured in weeks, and stay reachable by staff with production access, by legal process, or through a breach. The commitments are real. They are also revocable, and impossible to check from outside.
Private, and much weaker. A quantised model on a workstation sits a generation or more behind the frontier, and the gap is widest on long documents and sustained reasoning, which is most of the work this would be used for.
So most people take a third option and don't use it for the sensitive work. The litigation file, the patient history, the client's books, the source's identity. The material where the help would matter most is the material that never gets pasted into a prompt.
02 How this is different
Every claim on this page is meant to be falsifiable by someone outside Averon. If one stops being true, a third party should be able to show that without our cooperation.
The enclave image is built deterministically from public source. Clone the repository, run the build, and compare your hash against the measurement your client reported during attestation. If they differ, something we did not publish is running, and the client closes the connection.
Verification runs on your machine. The client validates the attestation report, walks the certificate chain to the silicon vendor, compares the measurement against the published reference, and binds the session key to it. Apache-2.0, so you can audit it or run a build compiled by someone with no connection to us.
Independent reports published in full: scope, method, and findings, including the findings still open at publication, with dates and remediation status. We publish the reports themselves, not summaries of them.
A permanent programme covering the enclave image, the attestation client, and the key-handling path. The highest tier is reserved for any demonstrated operator route to plaintext. Researchers may disclose 90 days after reporting, with or without our agreement.
How a session is established
03 What we're honest about
The claim below is narrow on purpose. A broader one would not hold up.
Your conversation is encrypted in transit into the enclave and is not decrypted anywhere else. TLS terminates inside the attested boundary. Sealed history, if you enable it, is encrypted to a key that only exists inside that boundary. There is no operator shell into a running enclave, no hypervisor-level memory introspection, and no logging of prompts or responses. These are properties of a published image whose hash your client checked before the session started, not policy statements.
Your conversation exists as plaintext in enclave memory while the model processes it. Inference requires that. What we can offer is that no operator, hypervisor, or host process has a path to that memory, and that you can check for the absence of such a path before you start.
Three further limits
Metadata still exists outside the enclave. We know that an account connected, roughly when, and how much compute it used, because billing requires it. We do not know what was said and hold no key that would tell us, but that is not the same as knowing nothing about you.
04 What we store
Some data has to live outside the enclave for the service to run. Here is which data, and where.
An email address, a payment reference held by our processor, and coarse usage counters for billing: request counts and token totals, not content. This is ordinary business data under ordinary protection.
Off unless you turn it on. When enabled, history is encrypted to a key sealed to the attested image and stored as ciphertext we can replicate, back up, and delete, but not open. If you lose your credential, the history is gone. Any recovery path we controlled would also be an access path.
Nothing is written. No history record, no generated title, no derived summary, no cache entry that outlives the session. The only persistent trace is the billing counter.
What we don't collect
On deletion
Deleting sealed history removes the ciphertext, and we can show the object is gone. We cannot make claims about content we were never able to read, and neither can anyone else. If you need a stronger deletion story than that, incognito is it, because nothing was written.
Retention schedule for the billing zone: TODO, published alongside the technical brief.
05 Pricing
Confidential computing hardware costs more per token than commodity inference. We would rather charge for that than take a second revenue stream out of your conversations. All tiers are pre-launch.
$0
$79 / month
$300 to $500 / month
Contact
06 Waitlist
One email when the private beta opens, and one more if the technical brief changes in a way that affects the guarantee.
The waitlist sits outside the enclave. It is an email address in an ordinary database.